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The Canadian Forest Product Industry and U.S. Trade Laws

by Christian G. Yoder

Introduction

In recent months, two of Canada's forest products sectors, the softwood lumber industry and the wood shakes and shingles industry, were subjected to two quite different United States trade law remedies. In March of 1986 the wood shakes and shingles industry was found by the International Trade Commission (ITC) to be exporting products into the United States at such increased quantities as to be the substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry (Wood Shakes and Shingles, Investigation No. TA-210-56). President Reagan followed the recommendation of three of the ITC's six Commissioners and imposed a 35% tariff. This was an "escape clause" or "section 201" case. On October 16, 1986, the International Trade Administration (ITA), a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, made a preliminary finding that the stumpage programs of the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec were countervailable domestic subsidies (51 F.R. 37453, October 22, 1986). If the ITA's final determination on December 30, 1986 is affirmative, and if the ITC finds by February 17, 1987 that the domestic industry has been materially injured by the subsidized imports, the 15% duty recommended by the ITA as a result of the preliminary finding will be imposed. In the meantime, a cash bond equal to the estimated net subsidy must be put up at the border.

These import relief actions took place in a charged political context. On the American side of the border, many beleaguered industries consider themselves as having been unfairly taken advantage of by foreigners for years, and the recent victories have aroused a sense of pride. American industry sees itself as having finally stood up for its rights. While Canadian exporters may see the Americans as armed to the teeth with an extensive array of trade weaponry, Americans see the trade remedies more as a last resort. Feeling frustrated in their attempts to get relief from their governments, they have mounted constant pressure on their Congressmen to "do something". Fine tuning existing trade remedies, or creating new ones, is the "something" that Congressmen do for their constituents.

On the Canadian side of the border, rather than tinker with trade remedies, the federal government seeks to achieve freer trade across the board. "Free trade" has many meanings to many people, one of which is that somehow, Canadians will be, or should be, exempt from the punitive American trade remedies. Free trade talks have been an important theme of the federal government's attempt to revive the Canadian economy, and both the forest products cases have added an element of tension to the already difficult process. The purpose of this article is to briefly discuss the two decisions from a legal (inasmuch as it is possible given the overriding political dimension of the problems) perspective.

The Wood Shakes and Shingles Case

As noted, the wood shakes and shingles case was a 201 action. Under this remedy, the domestic industry must prove to the ITC: firstly, that imports of articles concerned are entering the United States in increased quantities; secondly, that the domestic industry producing an article like, or directly competitive with, the imported article is being seriously injured, or is threatened with serious injury; and finally, that increased imports are a substantial cause of that injury (or threat thereof). If a majority of the Commissioners find that there has been serious injury, substantially caused by increased imports, recommendations (including those by dissenting Commissioners) as to the appropriate remedy are made to the President. These recommendations can include tariffs, tariff rate quotas, quotas, orderly marketing arrangements or adjustment assistance.

The 201 action has several features that differentiate it from "typical" legal remedies. Firstly, it is not aimed at "unfair" practices. The ITC's investigation does not

concern itself with why there may be increased imports. The emphasis instead is on whether they are increasing, and whether they are a substantial cause of, the serious injury. Secondly, the remedy is aimed at the entire world of importers, not at a particular culprit. In the wood shakes and shingles case, the imports happened to be entirely Canadian – but had other countries been involved, all would have been subject to the remedy. For example, Canada's mineral sector has in the past been drawn into escape clause actions involving zinc and copper which were largely precipitated by increased imports from other countries (Unwrought Copper TA-2-1-52; Unalloyed Unwrought Copper TA-201-32 and Unalloyed Unwrought Zinc TA-201-32). Thirdly, and perhaps of most significance, the tribunal which determines whether increased imports are a substantial cause of serious injury does not itself have the power to invoke the remedy. In 201 cases the President is given discretion to impose whatever the ITC recommends, or to fashion his own remedy by selecting a response from the statutorily prescribed options. The rationale for the remedy is not to give petitioners the right to private legal action, with a guaranteed decision one way or the other, but rather to give the President the discretion to shelter a battered industry if he feels it is in the national interest to do so.

Four of the ITC's six Commissioners found that increased imports of Canadian wood shakes and shingles were a substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry. Two dissented. Three of the Commissioners recommended a 35% tariff, while three recommended adjustment assistance. The President chose to impose the 35% tariff, ironically many would say, to placate the Senate Finance Committee, which was, at the time, deciding whether to let him proceed with free trade talks with Canada. In the earlier 201 Copper cases the ITC recommended import relief, but Presidents Carter and Reagan refused to provide it. In those cases, Congressmen from states where copper fabrication related employment was high convinced the Presidents that helping the mining industry would damage the fabrication industry and that the trade-off would not be politically wise. In the Shakes and Shingles case the President was in trouble with Congress over trade and there was no opposition domestic lobby with enough political clout to disuade him from imposing the tariff.

The Softwood Lumber Case

In 1983, Canadian provincial stumpage programs were exonerated by the ITA after a countervailing duty investigation (48 F.R. 24159, May 31, 1983) and some observers felt that, since the programs had not been changed between 1983 and 1986, the same result was assured. However, between 1983 and 1986 the law changed. In *Cabot Corporation et al* v. *United States* 620 F. Supp. 722 (CIT 1985) the Court of International Trade severely criticized the ITA's interpretation of the correct test for determining the existence of countervailable domestic subsidies. In light of this decision, the ITA reconsidered its 1983 decision and, with the assistance of new evidence about how the provincial governments exercised their discretion to allocate stumpage rights reached an affirmative result.

Subsidy cases are more controversial than 201 actions because they essentially involve a decision by the executive branch of the United States as to whether actions within the sovereign control of another country are fair. Notwithstanding the fact that many of the trading nations of the world, including Canada, have agreed under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that subsidies are to be disciplined, and no matter how objective the ITA strives to be in administering the countervailing duty legislation, no government likes to have its programs judged as unfair, particularly according to the laws of a foreign country. Once initiated by petitioners, the countervailing duty action (unlike the escape clause) runs its course – including the imposition of the remedy – without direct Presidential interference.

To find a countervailable domestic subsidy, the ITA must find that the impugned program is being specifically bestowed upon an industry or group of industries, and that this leads to the recipients receiving a measurable preference as compared to those not benefiting from the program. In 1983, the ITA found that stumpage programs were not specifically bestowed. In 1986, after examining evidence as to how the provincial governments exercised their discretion in allocating stumpage rights, the ITA found that the rights were being specifically bestowed. Although the ITA's reasoning is arguably consistent with the *Cabot* decision, the result, based on the facts of the case, is very disturbing from a Canadian perspective. The "specificity test" (as the legislative test for countervailable domestic subsidies is often referred to) has now been interpreted so broadly as to include almost any conceivable governmental natural resource allocation program. How can an owner of a resource allocate rights to it without exercising discretion? Is the ITA suggesting (as a remark in the decision could be taken to imply), that resources must be doled out on a first-come-first-served basis? If the ITA's decision were to be treated as legal precedent and analyzed for the purpose of distilling its ratio, one would be driven to the bald assertion that government ownership of resources is unfair. The countervailing duty amendments in the protectionist Bills before the 99th Congress (most notably H.R. 4800 which would have established a natural resource input subsidy definition) need not be reintroduced in similar Bills before th 100th Congress, now that the ITA has given the specificity test this broad interpretation.

Conclusion

Both the Wood Shakes and Shingles and the Softwood Lumber decisions are disappointing developments for the Canadian resource sector. The same legal tools could be used against other Canadian resources. Nor is it realistic to attempt to retaliate by penalizing American resource exports into Canada. The volume of resource trade is heavily skewed toward Canada as an exporter. It is also unrealistic to expect that free trade talks will eliminate these threats. To Americans, the right to sue is as much a matter of national identity as are the various cultural sensitivities of Canada to Canadians. And it is not likely that the U.S. trade deficit will be turned arour in the foreseeable future. The options available seem t come down to increased efforts at cooperative marketing strategies and a willingness to fight the legal battles resourcefully. In the Copper and Zinc cases, the Canadian side kept a low, non-political profile, and argued

successfully before the ITC on a strictly technical and legal basis, that Canadians had been fair traders. In the process, the mineral sector emphasized its positive business ties with those American interest groups that benefitted from Canadian products. The result was a perception of Canadians as fair players, as well as the isolation of some American producers from American consumers to the benefit of Canadian producers. The times and circumstances have changed but the approach may be no less appropriate today. Indeed, it may be the only realistic approach.

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Resisting Water Diversions: The Great Lakes Charter

by Susan Blackman

Diversion of water on a grand scale to serve the needs of the thirsty areas of our continent has recently generated a great deal of heated debate in Canada. Most proposals so far advanced are unrealistic for the foreseeable future given their prohibitive cost. Take, for example, the much publicized GRAND Canal scheme. This project would turn James Bay into a freshwater lake, pumping water south to the Great Lakes, and thence to the west and southwest to irrigate the Canadian prairies and the American sunbelt. The estimated cost of this project is $79 billion (U.S.). The costs of such large-scale projects suggest they will never be developed. Nevertheless, they stubbornly continue to appear on the public agenda.

However, there has also been recent interest in the United States in more modest proposals which, though still costly, are more realistic. For example, using a relatively small amount of water, coal can be transported through pipelines as a slurry, and indeed, the suggestion has been made of using water from Lake Superior to pipe coal west or southwest. More ambitiously, as the groundwater resources of the High Plains states are being severely depleted, the possibility has been raised of transporting water from a neighbouring basin to recharge the Ogallala aquifer. While this would not directly involve the Great Lakes, they might provide a source of water to partly replenish that taken from the intermediate basin (in this case, the Missouri River basin). This could be accomplished by increasing the existing diversion out of Lake Michigan at Chicago. Of course, the primary diversion between the Missouri River and the Ogallala aquifer would be very expensive.[1]

What is the legal context facing such diversions in the United States? Until recently, it was assumed that a state could legislatively prohibit the export of water across state lines. However, two recent court decisions have made it clear that states have no such power. In *Sporhase* v. *Nebraska* ((1982) 458 U.S. 941), the United States Supreme Court decided that water is an article of commerce, and that states cannot enact statutory embargoes on water export because they would too severely restrict interstate commerce. (Under the United States Constitution, interstate commerce is a matter of federal jurisdiction.) *Sporhase* has been applied by the District Court of New Mexico in *City of El Paso* v. *Reynolds* ((1984), 597 F.Supp. 694).

In the *Sporhase* case, Nebraska's groundwater law was challenged. This law authorized transfer of groundwater across the state line where the following conditions were met: 1) the taking of water was reasonable; 2) the taking was not contrary to the conservation and use of the water; 3) the taking was not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare; and 4) the state to which the water was being transferred allowed reciprocal water transfer. In the *Sporhase* case, the state to which the water was being transferred did not allow reciprocal transfers; therefore Nebraska's fourth restriction amounted to a total export ban.

Although *Sporhase* is a blow to a state's ability to manage its water resources, it is not left completely defenceless in resisting water export proposals. The Court in *Sporhase* did agree that a state's interest in preserving water supplies is a legitimate concern. Therefore, a state could put some restrictions on water transfers, such as the first three applied by Nebraska. The key here is that the restrictions must apply equally to both in-state and out-of-state users, in order not to put an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Thus, Nebraska could validly apply its first three restrictions, because it was nearly as difficult to get permission to transport water from one place to another within the state as it was to transport it across the state line. Another reason for upholding such restrictions was that Nebraska had a comprehensive groundwater management scheme in place, and could demonstrate a concern for groundwater conservation going back several years. This helped to prove the state's legitimate local interest in conservation. In the end, Nebraska lost only on its fourth restriction, the export ban. Likewise, in the *El Paso* case, New Mexico's restrictions on water transfers (similar to those of Nebraska, though more detailed) were upheld so long as they treated in-state and out-of-state users equally.

The major response of the Great Lakes states to the *Sporhase* problem was the Great Lakes Charter, signed in February, 1985 by the governors of the eight states and the premiers of Ontario and Quebec.[2] Since *Sporhase* made it clear that a state must have a comprehensive water management plan in place to be able to support controls on water transfers, it is not surprising that the main focus of the Charter is the development of a basin-wide management approach. Thus, the Charter urges uniform water management plans, aimed at water conservation and preservation of the public health and welfare, throughout the Great Lakes basin.

In effect, since water export embargoes are not permissible under U.S. law, the Charter takes the next-best approach of subjecting diversions to state control and limitations. Depending on the circumstances, permissible restrictions on water transfers may range from mild to severe to outright prohibition of exports. Thus the court in *Sporhase* allowed quite severe restrictions by Nebraska in those areas where it was experiencing rapid depletion of groundwater supplies. However, it seems reasonable to expect less judicial

leniency with the Great Lakes states, given their abundant water supplies. The stringent restrictions, allowed in Nebraska and New Mexico, may thus be found to be an impermissible burden on interstate commerce if applied to a Great Lakes state.

The Charter is not specific as regards possible restrictions on water transfer. It merely provides the following general and vague guidance: "...[D]iversions of Basin water resources will not be allowed if individually or cumulatively they would have any significant adverse impacts on lake levels, in-basin uses, and the Great Lakes Ecosystems". Beyond this, the Charter advocates state legislation which would require: 1) registration of new or increased withdrawals from the basin over 100,000 gal/day (380,000 l/day); 2) review and permitting of new or increased withdrawals over 2 mil gal/day (7.6 mil l/day); and 3) regional consultation for new or increased withdrawals over 5 mil gal/day (19 mil l/day). The registration requirement is aimed at gathering information. Since it does not involve preventing water transfer, it should not create problems for interstate commerce. However, the permitting and regional consultation requirements are another matter. These will be used to authorize or prevent water transfers on a project by project basis. When water transfer is denied, interstate commerce becomes a factor; therefore, to be upheld, requirements will have to be strongly supported by conservation and public welfare concerns and will have to apply equally to all users. The specific standards to be applied in granting permits, and the regional consultation procedures, are to be given more detail in individual state legislation and by the work of the Water Resources Management Committee (see below).

Should a state law based on the Charter ever be challenged in court, presumably the numbers used in the permitting provisions will have to be separately justified. Unfortunately, the basis for the numbers is never explained. For comparison, the system already in place throughout Ontario requires a permit for a taking of water in excess of 50,000 l/day. At the other extreme, the present withdrawal of water from Lake Michigan through the Chicago Diversion is over 2 bil gal/day.

One weakness of the Charter is that it lacks an express requirement for periodic review of the withdrawal limits. Surely, as more data becomes available, these numbers will have to be adjusted. Moreover, the Charter fails to recognize that withdrawals of the same amount from different places in the basin may have vastly different effects. Doubtless, this last omission was necessary for a political compromise, assuming that some states would not wish to subject themselves to more stringent withdrawal limits than others.

Another, and potentially severe, weakness of the Charter is that it is not a legally enforceable document, but only a good-faith agreement among the states and provinces which signed it. The consent of both federal governments would be required to make it legally binding as a matter of international law. Nevertheless, state governments are in fact moving to bring their legislation into line with the Charter, so that the missing coercive effect of a legally binding document may ultimately not prove significant.

Despite these criticisms, the Charter has a very important strength in its promotion of the basin-wide approach to Great Lakes problems. This approach is certainly much more consistent with hydrological and ecological realities than multiple approaches which vary along artificially drawn state and international boundaries. Indeed, basin-wide management has already been adopted for Great Lakes water quality problems.[3] Moreover, as a practical political consideration, if the whole region can act in a unified manner, its ability to resist diversion proposals should be that much stronger.

The other main strength of the Charter is its establishment of the Water Resources Management Committee. Although there are many public and private organizations in the Great Lakes area that deal with particular problems, they have overlapping, even conflicting, jurisdictions, and they do not bring together all the governments involved. The Charter needs an organization such as the Committee to implement its own provisions and to deal with water management problems. The Committee's work is well under way, particularly on the methods to be used for data collection, and it will soon be able to provide the information base needed for managing the Great Lakes in a comprehensive fashion.

Concurrent with the development of the Charter, private organizations in the Great Lakes area have also become very active in this field. Great Lakes United, for example, is an umbrella organization made up of many smaller private organizations. It is closely watching state and provincial government actions to implement the Charter, and has reported some progress in its February, 1986 report ("A Year After the Charter: The Threat of Water Diversions and the Implementation of the Great Lakes Charter"). Its opinion of the progress made is not, however, very encouraging with respect to the region as a whole, although some states have apparently moved quickly. Another private organization concerned with Great Lakes water problems is the Center for the Great Lakes. Its recent report provides a good overview of the water quantity management problems facing the Great Lakes, the present uses and economics of the Lakes, and the present law.[4] While Canadian law is somewhat neglected, this is not a serious drawback given that the most realistic diversion threats come from the United States.

The Charter's work in moving towards a basin-wide management program must continue. At present, specific legislation detailing withdrawal conditions is less important. A thorough and comprehensive management approach will not only better correspond to the conditions in the Great Lakes basin, it will also lay a solid foundation for water withdrawal restrictions that can withstand commerce clause attack.

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Footnotes

1. For an excellent source of information on Great Lakes diversions, see the International Joint Commission's 1985 publication, *Great Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses.*
2. The Charter can be found in Appendix III of the *Final Report and Recommendations:* Great Lakes Governors Task Force on Water Diversion and Great Lakes Institutions, January 1985.
3. See the *Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements* of 1972 and 1978.

4. The 1986 report ("The Law and the Lakes: Toward a Legal Framework for Safeguarding the Great Lakes Water Supply") also contains a good discussion of the Great Lakes Charter, which I have drawn upon in this comment.

Contract Law Course for Oil and Gas Personnel

On February 26 and 27 the Institute will present a Contract Law course at Calgary's Westin Hotel. Aimed at non-lawyers in the petroleum industry who deal extensively with contracts, the February course will be the first one to be open to the public. Previously, the course has been offered to employees of Gulf Canada, Home Oil, Canadian Superior, Mobil Oil, and Suncor Resources.

The course examines such issues as how a contract is formed and terminated, the concepts of consideration and privity, judicial approaches to the interpretation of contracts, and the calculation of damages. In addition, the course scrutinizes a number of clauses commonly found in petroleum industry contracts (including *force majeure,* independent contractor, choice of laws, liability and indemnity, and confidential information). The course does not focus upon specific *types* of contracts used in the industry but is geared for industry personnel at all levels whose jobs require them to understand the basics of contract law. Materials prepared for the course draw upon Canadian cases involving the petroleum industry.

Course instructors are Nicholas Rafferty, a contract law professor in The University of Calgary's Law Faculty, and Constance Hunt, Executive Director of the Institute. The course involves lectures by the instructors, but also utilizes individual and group problem-solving methods.

The registration fee is $295. This includes all materials and lunch at the Westin both days. If you are interested in registering for this course please contact Shirley Babcock at 220-3200 as soon as possible since space is limited.

Essay Prize

The Institute recently awarded its annual essay prize, in the amount of $1,000 to Mr. Donald Rothwell for his paper entitled "Does the Gulf of Maine Extend to the Beaufort Sea?" Mr. Rothwell has an LL.B. degree from the University of Queensland and an LL.M. from the University of Alberta. He is currently completing a Master's degree in Political Science. During 1985-86 he was enrolled in the University of Calgary Faculty of Law for the purpose of qualifying for the Alberta Bar. He will be returning to Australia in early 1987 to begin legal research in Sydney.

Mr. Rothwell's paper was one of twelve essays submitted to a Selection Committee comprised of Alastair R. Lucas, a professor in The University of Calgary's Faculty of Law (Chairman); P. Donald Kennedy, Q.C., a lawyer with the Calgary firm of Reed Donahue; and Anne Gervais of the Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board.

Students wishing to submit an essay for the 1987 Essay Prize should contact their Dean of Law for an application form. The deadline for submission of essays is June 30, 1987.

Other Institute Activities

- Institute staff have recently made a number of presentations to outside organizations. In November, Executive Director Constance D. Hunt spoke on "Oil and Gas Exploration, Development and Production in Canada: An Overview" at the Nordic Council of Ministers oil and gas seminar in Reykjavik, Iceland, and was a keynote speaker at the conference "Knowing the North: Integrating Technology, Tradition, and Science" sponsored by the Boreal Institute in Edmonton. In December, she was one of four panelists to participate in a session on aboriginal rights at the annual Geoscience Forum in Yellowknife, co-hosted by the Department of Indian Affairs and the Northwest Territories Chamber of Mines. In October, the Institute co-sponsored a conference organized by The 49th Parallel, an Institute for Canadian/American Relations. The conference, held in Helena, Montana, was on the subject of Canadian-U.S. boundary waters issues in the west. The speakers for the conference included Research Associate Barry Barton and contract researcher David Percy. Barry Barton also made a presentation in early December. He spoke on the *International Corona* case at the Northwest Mining Association conference in Spokane, Washington.

- In October the Institute held a workshop with the theme "Aboriginal Water Rights" in Saskatoon. Organized in conjunction with the Native Law Centre at the University of Saskatchewan, the workshop attracted more than 60 participants from across Canada to discuss native water rights. The workshop was conducted under the auspices of the Institute's Canadian Water Law Project, funded by the Donner Canadian Foundation and the federal Department of the Environment. Funding for the "Aboriginal Water Rights" workshop was provided by the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Saskatchewan region). The next issue of *Resources* will feature articles by workshop participants.

- The Institute recently hosted Dr. Don L. Tiffin, a visitor from Fiji. Dr. Tiffin was visiting the Institute as a representative of the Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in South Pacific Offshore Areas.

- The Institute is now able to send and receive documents through a facsimile communications ("fax") machine at the University of Calgary. The fax number is (403) 220-7000.

Publications

Liability for Drilling- and Production-Source Oil Pollution in the Canadian Offshore, Christian G. Yoder. Working Paper 12. 1986. ISBN 0-919269-20-6. 85 p. $15.00

A Guide to Appearing Before the Surface Rights Board of Alberta, (Second Edition), by Barry Barton and Barbara Roulston. Working Paper 11. 1986. ISBN 0-919269-19-2. 124 p. $15.00

Crown Timber Rights in Alberta, by N.D. Bankes. Working Paper 10. 1986. ISBN 0-919269-17-6. 128 p. $15.00

A Reference Guide to Mining Legislation in Canada, by Barry Barton, Barbara Roulston, and Nancy Strantz. Working Paper 8. 1985. ISBN 0-919269-15-X. 120 p. $20.00

The Canadian Regulation of Offshore Installations, by Christian G. Yoder. Working Paper 9. 1985. ISBN 0-919269-18-4. 116 p. $15.00

The Assignment and Registration of Crown Mineral Interests, by N.D. Bankes. Working Paper 5. 1985. ISBN 0-919269-11-7. 126 p. $15.00

Oil and Gas Conservation on Canada Lands, by Owen L. Anderson. Working Paper 7. 1985. ISBN 0-919269-16-8. 122 p. $15.00

Public Disposition of Natural Resources, Essays from the First Banff Conference on Natural Resources Law, Banff, Alberta, April 12-15, 1983; Nigel Bankes and J. Owen Saunders, eds. ISBN 0-919269-14-1. 366 p. (hardcover) $45.00

Canadian Maritime Law and the Offshore: A Primer, by W. Wylie Spicer. Canadian Continental Shelf Law 3; Working Paper 6. 1984. ISBN 0-919269-12-5. 65 p. $11.00

Fairness in Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Processes, Proceedings of a Seminar, The Banff Centre, February 1-3, 1983; Evangeline S. Case, Peter Z.R. Finkle and Alastair R. Lucas, eds. Proceedings 2. ISBN 0-919269-08-7. 125 p. $15.00

Canadian Electricity Exports: Legal and Regulatory Issues, by Alastair R. Lucas and J. Owen Saunders. Working Paper 3. 1983. ISBN 0-919269-09-5. 40 p. $7.50

The International Legal Context of Petroleum Operations in Canadian Arctic Waters, by Ian Townsend Gault. Canadian Continental Shelf Law 2; Working Paper 4. 1983. ISBN 0-919269-10-9. 76 p. $7.00

Acid Precipitation in North America: The Case for Transboundary Cooperation, by Douglas M. Johnston and Peter Finkle. 1983. ISBN 0-919269-02-8. 75 p. $8.00

Petroleum Operations on the Canadian Continental Margin - The Legal Issues in a Modern Perspective, by Ian Townsend Gault. Canadian Continental Shelf Law 1; Working Paper 2. 1983. ISBN 0-919269-02-8. 113 p. $8.00

Environmental Law in the 1980s: A New Beginning, Proceedings of a Colloquium, The Banff Centre, November 27- 29, 1981; Peter Z.R. Finkle and Alastair R. Lucas, eds. Proceedings 1. ISBN 0-919269-05-2. 233 p. $13.50

Environmental Regulation - Its Impact on Major Oil and Gas Projects: Oil Sands and Arctic, by C.D. Hunt and A.R. Lucas. 1980. ISBN 0-919269-00-1. 168 p. $10.95

Resources Law Bibliography. 1980. ISBN 0-919269-01-X. 537 p. $19.95

Resources: The Newsletter of the Canadian Institute of Resources Law. ISSN 0714-5918. Quarterly. free

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